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In this paper, we briefly show how the quantum key distribution with blind polarization bases
[Kye et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 95, 040501 (2005)] can be made secure against the invisible photon
attack.
PACS numbers: 03.67.-a,03.67.Dd,03.67.Hk
Recently, we introduced a new quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD)[1]-we call this as the KKKP to stand for ini-
tials of the authors-using random polarization bases and
three-way communication between Alice and Bob, two le-
gitimate users of the key. In the KKKP, Alice chooses a
random value of angle θ and prepares a qubit pulse with
the polarization of that angle. Upon reception of the
qubit, Bob chooses another random value of angle φ and
further rotates the polarization direction of the received
photon state by φ and then returns to Alice. Alice en-
codes the message by rotating the polarization angle by
±pi/4 after compensating the angle by −θ. Bob reads the
photon state by measuring the polarization, after com-
pensating the angle by −φ. Alice and Bob shall choose
random angles, θ and φ, for each transmission of qubits.
This will be continued until the desired number of bits
are created. We extended it to embody a qubit by a set
of two pulses in order to make the scheme robust against
the impersonation attack. In principle, the KKKP can
be used for a secure direct communication channel even
though this is not what is claimed by the authors because
of the random security check.
In a recent paper[2], Cai questioned the security of
the so-called ping-pong quantum communications under
invisible photon attack (IPA). Here, a ping-pong quan-
tum communication is a way of secure direct communi-
cation based on quantum theory pioneered by Bostro¨m
and Felbinger[3]. In fact, the IPA is a type of the Tro-
jan Horse attack[4] under which most of the QKD’s are
insecure.
However, the KKKP is designed to be relatively strong
against a simple IPA as legitimate users’ operations are
all random. As Cai pointed out, the randomness of
the operations makes it impossible to read the key only
by sending and reading spy photons. The eavesdropper
(Eve) has to take at least one photon out from the first
travel of the qubit pulse from Alice to Bob then she com-
pares the polarization of the disbound photon(s) with
that of the spy photons which she sends to Alice along
with the returning qubit pulse from Bob to Alice. As we
point out in Ref. [1], if Alice and Bob randomly check the
intensities of the qubit pulses, Eve’s action of taking one
photon out from the Alice-to-Bob channel should be no-
ticed. In practice, the inefficiency of the photo detection
may be a problem and in particular for a lossy channel, it
is impossible to distinguish Eve’s action from the channel
loss.
It is, however, important to note another advantage
of the KKKP due to the fact that the returning pulse
from Bob to Alice has another random parameter φ given
by Bob. Eve should be able to separate her spy pho-
tons from the legitimate photons to read Alice’s action
of −θ ± pi/4. If Eve’s spy photon is indistinguishable
then the photons, which travel finally to Bob from Alice,
will have the polarization angle as a mixture of φ ± pi/4
and −θ + φ ± pi/4. Here, the second polarization angle
is due to Eve’s spy photons which are assumed initially
to have 0 polarization angle. Now, we know the reason
why Eve’s spy photons should be distinguishable from
the legitimate photons. As Cai said, one way to achieve
this is to use photons of different frequencies. In order
to prevent from such the attack, Alice and Bob should
choose the optical devices which have a very small fre-
quency bandwidth. These days, the bandwidth of optical
devices is as narrow as 0.1 or 0.01nm which is comparable
to the laser linewidth so that Eve’s attack should be able
to be securely defended. An optical grating to filter out
unwanted frequencies may be used in combination with
such the narrow bandwidth devices.
In this short communication, the security of the KKKP
has been reviewed.
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